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China in Between Varieties  
of Capitalism and Communism 
 
Maria Csanadi 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper is challenging mainstream views about the contemporary Chinese system  as a 
developmental state and a variety of capitalism. Based on a comparative analytical model 
(Csanádi, 1997, 2006) I will demonstrate that in China the general features of a communist 
system prevail to date, and that the „Chinese specifics”  is a structural variety of those general 
features. I will point out why the Chinese system is neither capitalist nor post-socialist. 
Instead, it is a complex party-state system in the process of transformation comparable, but 
not identifyable -- to all other party-state systems in their period of operation and 
transformation. Mainstream concepts of Chinese developmental state, state capitalism, 
socialist market economy, emerging system, hybrid system variegated capitalism, 
polymorphous state, centralized developmental autocracy, entrepreneurial state, 
instrumental development state and clientelist state may be detected embedded in and 
accomodated to this complex and transforming party-state system. 
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distribution, China 
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Kína a kapitalizmus és kommunizmus változatai között 
 
Csanádi Mária 
 
Összefoglaló 
 
Ez a cikk vitába száll azokkal a mainstream nézetekkel, amelyek a jelenlegi kínai rendszert 
fejlesztő államként és a kapitalizmus egyik változataként értelmezik. Egy összehasonlító 
elemző modell segítségével (Csanádi, 1997, 2006) szemléltetem, hogy egyrészt Kínában a 
pártállamok általános sajátosságai máig érvényesülnek, másrészt azt, hogy az úgynevezett 
„kínai stílus” (Chinese style) az általános sajátosságok egy specifikus szerkezeti változata. 
Bemutatom, hogy a kínai rendszer sem nem kapitalista, sem nem posztszocialista, hanem egy 
átalakulásban levő komplex pártállami rendszer, amely az összes korábbi és jelenlegi 
pártállam működésével és azok átalakulásával összevethető, de nem azonosítható. A 
mainstream elemzések Kínára is alkalmazott fogalmi apparátusa – a fejlesztő állam, az 
államkapitalizmus, a szocialista piacgazdaság, a feltörekvő rendszer, a hibrid rendszer, a 
változatos (variegated) kapitalizmus, a polimorf állam, a központosított fejlesztő autokrácia, 
az instrumentális fejlesztő állam, a klientúraépítő állam – az átalakuló pártállami rendszerbe 
ágyazottan és hozzá idomulva lelhető fel.  
 
 
 
Tárgyszavak: fejlesztő állam, kapitalizmusváltozat, pártállam, hálózat, hatalmi eloszlás, 
Kína 
 
 
JEL kódok: P1, P2, P3, P5 
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INTRODUCION 
Opposing simultaneous phenomena in Chinese economic developents repeatedly motivate 
sholars to find all-encompassing systemic interpretations to the puzzles. For example, to 
justify why  China experienced thirty years of reforms and achieved double digit growth until 
mid 2010s while most of her communist counterparts collapsed; or how can a communist 
regime co-exist with, moreover, fuel the development of a liberal market; what is the logic of 
stimulating the expansion of private ownership and the continuing preference on large state-
owned enterprises; why does a strictly authoritarian regime tolerate and spur decentralized 
development; why the central government simultaneously creates and unleashes operations 
at stock markets while directly intervenes and clamps down on financial experts in case of 
stock market crisis? What is the reason of the strong state intervention, the repeated stimulus 
packages to compensate slow-down and the skyrocketing loans despite national level and 
local investment overheating, and increase of local government indebtedness, the resurgence 
and increase of non-performing loans of large state-owned enterprises and the emergence of 
shadow banking? 
 The analysis and interpretation of the Chinese Communist system, the specifics of its way 
of functioning, and also the impact of the global crisis and its present economic slow-down 
attract the attention of a great number of China and comparative experts both internationally 
and within China. Outstanding studies from several research fields were born on a broad 
range of topics.
1
 However, theories that were applied as explanatory tools, such as theories of 
democratization, decentralization, state-society relations, authoritarianism, principal-agent 
theory, group theory, reform theory, transition theory were borrowed from the analysis of 
capitalist systems. Though even socialist system theory was applied distinguishing classical 
and reformist socialist systems, none of these theories consider the influence of the strong, 
institutionalized interactive network of interdependency of economic and political actors 
during decision-making. Consequently, they do not count with the self-similarities of these 
interdependencies among and within party states in general and their specific Chinese traits 
in particular on national and sub-national levels and their consequences on economic and 
political dynamics. Without building on this network, the close interrelation among likely 
independent phenomena, have not yet gained a systemic explanation.  
  
                                                        
1 These topics were: the Chinese Communist Party, the reforms, the institutional structure, 
government policies, monetary and fiscal issues at national and subnational levels, foreign trade, 
investments, FDI, Asian crisis, global crisis. 
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CHANGING FOCUS OF COMPARATIVE VIEWS ON CHINESE REFORMS AND 
DEVELOPMENT 
From the early 1990s, after new economic reforms stimulated by Deng Xiao Ping were 
implemented a steady and fast macroeconomic growth was experienced. This development 
started following a strong economic recession due to overall economic restrictions and 
political clamp down by the Chinese political regime to escape from the domino effect of 
regime collapses in Europe. Based on these facts, students of the Chinese economy and 
society overwhelmingly focused on economic reforms. Owing to their positive impression 
they propagated the ideal sequence of reforms starting with economic rather than political 
changes that induce macroeconomic growth rather than economic crisis experienced in all 
post-communist states, engaging in gradual reforms rather than shock therapy prioritized in 
Poland and Russia, and reforms from below rather than from above that failed both in 
Hungary and in China in the 1980s (Chen at al., 1992; Shirk, 1993; Solinger, 1993; Qian and 
Xu, 1993; Walder, 1995; Weingast, 1995; Naughton, 1996; Nolan, 1996; Pearson, 1997; Qian 
and Roland, 1998; Woo, 1998; Cao at al., 1999; Denglian and Haines, 1997).   
For experts studying the Eastern European and Soviet system transformation, “transition 
to democracy” and „transformational recession” became a hot topic for more than a decade in 
comparative literature (Aslund, 1993; Gelb, et al.  1994; Gomulka, 1994; Sachs, 1994; Sachs 
and Woo, 1997; Hellman, 1998; World Bank, 1996; Kornai, 1994). China was rarely among 
those compared, since neither democratic transformation, nor economic recession was 
characterisic to it. 
After a decade, the scientific interest on transition in former communist countries faded 
away (Carothers, 2002), and comparative focus shifted to the varieties of capitalism 
including post-communist states (Peck and Zhang, 2013). Contrary to the earlier decades of 
comparative literature on transformation when China was neglected in transitology, the 
transforming Chinese system has been among those compared. However, interpretations and 
definitions of the Chinese system and that of its transformation became multiple 
They range from state capitalism (Szamosszegi and Kyle, 2011), to socialist market 
economy, developmental state (on national level Bolesta, 2011; on local level Oi, 1995), 
emerging system, hybrid system (Lynn Walsh, 2008), variegated capitalism (Zhang and Peck, 
2014), post-socialist-developmental state (Bolesta, 2011), neoliberal state, polymorphous 
state (Howell, 2006, p. 275, 278), centralized developmental autocracy (Naughton, 2008), 
entrepreneurial state (Duckett, 1998), instrumental development state (Heep, 2014), 
clientelist state (Ong, 2012) etc. Thus, differences emerge in their approach of defining the 
authoritarian regime (predatory, socialist, developmental, neoliberal, entrepreneurial, 
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power-elite), the kind of capitalism (state, emerging, hybrid), and its sub-national varieties 
(varigated, polymorph, fragmented, entrepreneurial).  
Why are so many concepts attributed to the Chinese system? Can suggested varieties be 
comprehensively interpreted? One idea brings most of the multiple interpretations to 
common grounds: the authoritarian rule and the economic subfield is explicitely or tacitly 
considered a variety of a capitalist system. Owing to unanimous platform but varied focus, 
researchers are inclined to compare China not only with the European post-socialist systems, 
but also with developed capitalist systems, or with formerly authoritarian Asian capitalist 
regimes (Bolesta, 2011). Some of the enumerated concepts, however are either systemicly 
opposed to or do not directly match those of capitalism, such as state-socialism, post-
communism. Thus, the puzzle becomes even more complex: is the Chinese system capitalist 
or communist? Is the Chinese system in the process of transformation or is it post-
communist? How can opposing concepts be verified? Is it possible to put systemicly opposing 
concepts to common grounds?  
The goal of this paper is to point on the missing factors in comparison from both basic 
opposing approaches that allow for comprehensive interpretation. These factors are the 
following:  
• The general characteristics of the party-state systems 
• The specific characteristics of the Chinese party-state 
• The characteristics of transformation of the Chinese party-state 
• The state’s role in the transforming party-state context 
Next, a comparative party-state model will be introduced demonstrating the complexity 
of party-state systems, both during operation and transformation. Structure, operation and 
transformation dynamics reveals the characteristics of the missing factors from current 
comparisons and serves as a comprehensive interpretation of both varieties and opposing 
concepts.  
 
THE FRAMEWORK OF COMPARISON THAT INTERPRETATIONS DO NOT 
CONSIDER: THE INTERACTIVE PARTY-STATE (IPS) MODEL 
The basis of comparison is the the power network that evolved historically from a political 
entity (the communist party) into a social system. The Communist Party first monopolized 
the political subsphere, than stretched out its instruments of power and broke through the 
boundaries of non-party organizations. Within these latter the party reached out to the 
positional, organizational and activity structure and individuals. Instruments of power 
thereby formed a politically monopolized interactive network with in-built inequalities in 
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bargaining capacities evolving into a social system where state and state role in the 
transforming party-state system are embedded. Structural and dynamic characteristics of this 
social system are interpreted in a comparative analytical model the Interactive PArty-State 
(IPS) model (Csanádi, 2006).  
The IPS model is a bottom-up construction that comprises the self-similarities and 
differences of party states as outcomes of the structural characteristics of power distribution, 
which are interpreted as networks. In terms of both dependency and interest promotion, 
there are strongly intertwined relationships among decision-makers in the party, the state, 
and the economy. This leads to a specific process of decision-making, which is responsible for 
the emergence of such networks (Figure 1). Main elements of the party-state network are as 
follows: 1. the party hierarchy, which monopolizes the political sub-sphere. 2. The state 
hierarchy, which monopolizes the economic sub-sphere and, therefore, the extraction and 
distribution of resources. 3. Interlinking dependency lines, which origin in the party 
hierarchy as its instruments of power that reach out to structures of positions, activities, and 
organizations in non-party hierarchies. 4. Structural feedbacks, within both party and state 
hierarchies as well as between state and party hierarchies. Possible connections between 
these network elements follow some simple principles. Interlinking dependency lines can 
originate only in the party hierarchy, since they are the power instruments of the party (e.g. 
the nomenclatura system). Feedbacks between the two hierarchies can origin in non-party 
hierarchies, because the loop of feedback is formed by interlinking dependency lines that 
originate in the party hierarchy (Csanádi, 2006).  
Figure 1  
Main elements of the party-state network and paths of dependency  
and interest promotion (a-i) 
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Due to these principles of connection, the operation of the network also follows certain 
rules. Since each actor commands dependency lines originating in its own hierarchy, and 
only actors in party hierarchy command dependency lines interlinking all other actors, 
dependencies, the promotion of interests, and the extraction and distribution of resources 
are, either directly or indirectly, politically monopolized and economic behavior of actors are 
politically rational (in selective distribution, drive for growth and accumulating feedbacks). 
The main elements, and main connecting and operating principles of this network are self-
similar. (For connecting and operating principles in more detail see Csanádi 2006.) This 
means that the network has the same fundamental characteristics over time and space (i.e. in 
different regions and countries or evenunits at the same sub-national level) and levels of 
aggregation (national and sub-national levels).
2
  
Despite these self-similarities, however, major elements might have various 
configurations, which result in a vast variety of structural characteristics of power 
distribution over various party states. Differences in the distribution of power depend on the 
combination of the level of strictness within party and state hierarchies; how centralized the 
origins of interlinking lines within the party hierarchy are; how centralized the extraction and 
distribution of resources along the state hierarchy is; from which level the structural 
feedbacks within and between hierarchies originate; to what level these feedbacks reach in 
party and state hierarchies; and what is the level of integration reflected by the location and 
accumulation of structural feedbacks. These are the factors along which differences between 
various party states emerge combined with individual specifics. These differences might 
constitute three characteristically different patterns of power distribution, which we call the 
self-exploiting, self-disintegrating, and self-withdrawing patterns. Each pattern is 
characterized by the three main pattern-forming elements. These are the level of 
centralization of the interlinking lines that origin in the party hierarchy, the level of 
centralization of the extraction and distribution of resources in the state hierarchy, and the 
density and strength of feedbacks within or across the hierarchies. Each pattern name refers 
to inherent structural and operational traps within the network, which after a while 
necessarily lead to the transformation of the entire party-state system in the way expressed 
by the names of each pattern.  
 
                                                        
2 For example, self-similar structural characteristics in different time, space and aggregation levels 
and consequences could be be detected in Bunce’s two papers: on national level when she described 
the Breznev era (Bunce, 1989) and at the highest aggregation level, when analyzing the 
deterioration of the relationship among the Soviet Union and its satelite party-states from Soviet 
assets to Soviet liabilities (Bunce, 1985), in Huang’s paper on the web of interests and behavior at 
local level in China (Huang, 1990) and in Walder’s book (1986) when describing work and authority 
in Chinese industry at the enterprise management level. 
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For the self-exploiting pattern, the origins of interlinking lines within the party hierarchy 
as well as the extraction and distribution of resources within the state hierarchy are 
centralized, while feedbacks in the network are weak or scarce. This pattern prevailed in the 
Soviet Union during Stalin, in the 1950s in Eastern Europe and China, until the revolution in 
1991 in Romania and to date in North Korea. This pattern of party-state system is called as 
classical or communist system (Bolesta, 2011) that operates with compulsory planning and 
forced resource distribution. In the self-disintegrating pattern interlinking lines in the party 
hierarchy are relatively decentralized, while the extraction and distribution of resources in 
the state hierarchy is centralized, and feedbacks are strong. In the self-withdrawing pattern 
the origins of interlinking lines within the party hierarchy as well as the extraction and 
distribution of resources in the state hierarchy are relatively decentralized and feedbacks are 
strong. A main difference between the patterns are the differing distribution of bargaining 
capacities among actors within the network, thus, the actors’ capacities to extract, attract, 
and distribute resources, and resist to or benefit from state and party interventions. We call 
these capacities together as constraints of self-reproduction within the network.  In the self-
exploiting pattern, actors have a low capacity to resist state and party intervention and the 
extraction of resources. Hence, in this pattern actors have the lowest bargaining capacities 
and the highest reproduction constraints while the frequency of meeting hardening resource 
contraints of the structure as a whole is low. The self-withdrawing pattern is just the 
opposite. Here the capacities of actors to extract and distribute resources are decentralized, 
so bargaining capacities are the highest and constraints of self-reproduction are the lowest 
and the frequency of the structure meeting hardening reproduction constraints is high. 
The structure of party states might undergo the following sorts of changes:  
1. Changes within patterns: For each pattern, the distribution of bargaining capacities 
may vary in time, space, and at different levels of aggregation of the network, while the 
network itself keeps its main pattern characteristics.  
2. Shifts between patterns: If pattern characteristics change, the pattern itself will change, 
but no transformation of the system takes place. For example, in China a pattern shift 
occurred due to Mao Zedong’s repeated decentralization campaigns, which led to temporary 
collapses of the self-exploiting pattern. By the time Deng Xiaoping took the power, the 
evolving pattern shift resulted in the stabilization of a new, self-withdrawing pattern of power 
distribution. A fundamental transformation of the system did not happen, however.  
3. System change: If main structural elements wane, a system transformation will occur. 
Such changes occurred in Eastern European and Soviet Union and consecutively to its 
republics. These transformations, however, were not uniform as the patterns of power 
distribution also define the sequence, speed, and conditions of system transformation. In the 
self-disintegrating pattern political transformation takes place first, economic 
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transformation comes only thereafter. System transformation evolves here gradually under a 
democratic regime enhanced and accompanied by economic crisis. In the self-withdrawing 
pattern economic transformation occurs first, political transformation comes later. In this 
case transformation takes place gradually and under authoritarian rule accompanied 
byeconomic growth, just as in China since the early 1990s. In the self-exploiting pattern 
political and economic transformations overlap each other and are thus abrupt, just as they 
were in the case of Romania when the system of Cauşescu collapsed. Their economic and 
political outcomes are uncertain due to long-stretched economic crisis (Csanádi, 2006, 
2011a). The patterns of power distribution in party-state networks also contribute to different 
systemic outcomes, i.e. differences in the newly emerging political and economic systems 
(Bunce, 1999; Csanádi, 2006; Bohle & Greskovits, 2012). 3 
 
THE IPS MODEL AND ITS SENSITIVITY TO EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL 
CRISES 
The level of sensitivity and resistence of different patterns to external and internal pressures
4
 
and shocks are different, irrespective of whether these pressures are simultaneous or 
alternating. The level of sensitivity is mirrored by the responsiveness of the network to 
pressures and its ability to adapt to external and internal shocks. Differences in this level 
depend on the type of pattern of power distribution, since it is the pattern determining the 
capacity of actors to resist increasing extraction of internal resources in case external 
resources become scarce. The lower the capacity of actors within the network to resist, the 
higher is the capacity of the network to extract further resources from within. In this sense, 
the self-exploiting pattern is the least sensitive and the self-withdrawing pattern is the most 
sensitive (Csanádi, 2006). 
The sensitivity and responsiveness of the system to external and internal adaptation 
pressures might vary according to the duration of external and internal shocks, the pattern of 
power distribution, geographical position (countries, provinces, prefectures at the same level 
of aggregation may have different levels of sensitivity and responsiveness), and the level of 
                                                        
3 The interactive party-state model built on network involving all actors of the society and defining 
structural inequalities substantially differs from „bureaucratic coordination” defined by Kornai 
(1993) that involves a multi-level hierarchy of sub- and superordination.  
4 From the point of view of the system, external pressures were for example for China and Vietnam, 
the death of Stalin in 1953 the domino collapse of European Communist systems in 1989-1991, the 
Asian crisis in the late 1990s, and the global crisis beginning in 2008. Internal shocks are for 
instance: the death of the country’s authoritarian leader (Gheorghiu-Dej in Romania in 1965, Mao 
in 1976); campaigns of decentralization (e.g. those of Mao during his reign); popular uprisings (like 
those in Eastern European party states in the early and mid-1950s and the Tiananmen Square 
events in China in 1989); or the periods of dramatic shortage of resources to distribute within the 
network. 
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aggregation (scale). Shocks may occur at different stages of the system’s operation. They are 
possible during both the period of self-reproduction, when main characteristics of the system 
and the pattern prevail, and during the transformation of the system, when characteristics of 
the system and those of the pattern gradually fade and main traits of another system emerge. 
Adaptation may end up in regeneration, in other words, restructuring power relations 
without changing the patterns of power distribution, but they might also conclude in 
changing pattern or even lead to transformation.  
According to the IPS model and historical evidence, regeneration of the system is possible 
if among the two categories of external and internal reproduction constraints of the system 
one gets hard, while the other remains soft. Pattern shifts occur when external and internal 
pressures are simultaneous and force the collapse of the system, but pressures last for a short 
period and, therefore, collapse is temporary and regeneration is possible. Historically, we 
only have examples for a shift from the self-exploiting pattern to self-disintegrating and self-
withdrawing ones. Independent of pattern characteristics, transformation is likely to begin 
when both external and internal constraints become hard and they simultaneously persist for 
longer time. Whether external and internal constraints are alternating or simultaneous, and 
differences in their duration may explain why governments in similar patterns but at 
different periods as well as in the same period but in different patterns react differently to 
similar pressures. The process of transformation means the gradual or abrupt retreat of the 
network from overlapped subspheres and the expansion of the field outside the network. 
Retreat may be interpreted as relative or absolute: relative when expansion of the field 
outside the network is faster than that of the retreat of the network; absolute when the 
network physically retreats by being withdrawn, cut, are weakened or emptied (Csanádi, 
2011). Absolute and relative retreat may occur parallel in time at different dimensions of the 
network.  
Whether external and internal pressures of adaptation are alternating or simultaneous it 
also influences the dynamics of transformation. It may be speeding it up or slowing it down, 
while this impact might be different in space (among countries, provinces, prefectures etc.), 
in time, and at different levels of aggregation (at different scales) (Csanádi, 2006, 2009, 
2011a, 2011b; Csanádi & Liu, 2012).  
As explained in the IPS model, its elements as well as principles of connection and 
operation of the network are self-similar in time, and self-similar, too, at its different levels of 
aggregation and in different domains of the geographical space it covers (e.g. in different 
provinces of a country). Variations in the pattern may occur however, so the sensitivity and 
adaptation of lower level units can be different. These variations may change the spatial 
configuration of the dynamics of transformation at different periods on the given level, 
resulting in disparities in the dynamics of transformation, both in terms of space and 
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between various levels of aggregation. The possibility of such outcomes was demonstrated in 
the early and mid-2000s in the transforming Chinese self-withdrawing pattern (Csanádi and 
Lai, 2003; Csanádi, Lai & Gyuris, 2009, Csanádi, Nie and Li, 2015). 
 
THE IPS MODEL INTERPRETATED ON CHINA – A SPECIFIC PATTERN OF 
POWER DISTRIBUTION 
Based on the above, we may conclude the following: by the end of the 1950s a version of the 
self-expoiting pattern evolved in China that due to several decentralization campaigns 
initiated by Mao during the „Great leap forward” and the Cultural Revolution repeatedly 
partially and temporary collapsed, and finally regenerated in a version of the self-
withdrawing pattern. The decentralized nature of the Chinese power network means the 
subordination of state owned enterprises to the discretion of different level govenmental 
organizations. Administratively, the lower the rank of the government level, the smaller the 
size and importance of the subordinated SOEs. The respective level of interlinking lines reach 
out to the positional, organizational and activity structure and individual party members in 
the state hierarchy in the state-owned economic units.  By the time Deng Xiao Ping took 
power this pattern has stabilized: a relatively decentralized resource extraction and 
distribution, relatively decentralized interlinking lines in the party hierarchy that reached out 
to positional, activity and organizational structure and individuals in non-party fields and in 
strong feedbacks reaching higher levels of the party and state hierarchy.
5
 During that process 
China changed from a variety of self-exploiting pattern to a variety of self-withdrawing 
pattern. As previous centralized resource extraction measures of self-exploiting patterns did 
not work due to the increased resisting capacity of actors in the decentralized pattern, from 
the mid 1980s, adapting to the new distribution of power, decentralizing reforms within the 
party-state network were implemented, further delegating decision-making power and 
resources to local levels. The decentralized power network is reflected in the decentralized 
institutional and decision-making structure: in the decentralized public functions, 
decentralized SOE subordination, decentralized possibilities of extraction and distribution of 
resources (owing to local subordination, taxes, and banks), and decentralized infrastructure 
financing that renders a key role for local governments in the local development process. 
Decentralization of earlier central discretions within the network – with some exceptions 
(e.g. 1994 resource centralizing tax reforms) -- continued through the 1980s to the present. 
                                                        
5 For example, managers of large state owned enterprises are members of the Central Committee of 
the CCP, and over 50 SOE top managers (party secretary, CEO and chairman of the board are in the 
nomenklatura responsibility of the Central Organization Department reviewed and appropved by 
the Standing Committee of the Politburo 
http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/10_26_11_CapitalTradeSOEStudy.pdf p. 75 
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Decentralizing reforms allow for expanded decision-making rights for both SOEs and sub-
national government authorities followed by larger jurisdiction of sub-national party 
authorities. Decentralized power distribution, institutional responsibilities and respective 
management of economic development are reflected also in the share of local investments in 
all investments in fixed assets. According to Szamosszegi and Kyle (2011, p- 33, Figure IV-1),  
in 2009, investments in fixed assets undertaken, overseen and permitted by sub-national 
governments was overwelming in all sectors, including manufacturing (95%), real-estate 
(98%), construction (92%), mining (68%) and different services (between 99 and 48 %).
6
  
The new instruments of resource extraction and distribution did not change the self-
similar characteristics of party-state systems. For example, the distribution of resources at all 
levels remained politically rational, thus leading the reproduction of the structure to frequently 
hardening constraints and thereby to decentralizing reform escalation by the center. Self-
similarity and decentralized nature on national level attracts the potential multiplicity of 
patterns of power distribution between different levels of aggregation of the network and in 
space at different units of each aggregation level.
7
 Different patterns of power distribution 
provide the varieties of operation at different local levels and their different bargaining 
positions within the network.
8
  
 
STATE INTERVENTION, STATE OWNERSHIP  
State intervention and role of the state in party-state systems and during their 
transformation cannot be simplified to the activity of an authoritarian regime and its 
                                                        
6 Local level share of investments in services were also high but lower than in manufacturing and 
construction and differed by sub-sectors:  Computer Services & Software (48%); Production and 
Supply of Electricity, Gas and Water (66%); Mining (68%); Transport, Storage and Post (71%); 
Financial Intermediation (74%); Financial Intermediation (77%); Scientific Research., Technical 
Service and Geologic Prospecting (78%), Education (95%);  Health, Social Security an social 
Welfare (96%); Public Management and Social organization (97%); Culture, Sports and 
Entretainment (97%); Leasing and Business Services (98%); Management of Water Conservancey 
and Environmental and Pubic Facilities (98%); Hotel and Catering Services (98%); Services to 
Household and other Services (99%); Agriculture, Forestry, Animal Husbandry and Fishery (99%); 
Wholesale and Retail Sales (99%) (Szamosszegi and Kyle, 2011, p. 32, Figure IV-1). 
7 The pattern that finally stabilizes is influenced by local individual characteristics such as size, 
geographical and geopolitical location, traditions, historical development, economic development, 
economic structure, social stratification etc).  
8 Local governments at the eve of the global crisis were deprived by law from the chance to direct 
loans, periodically of issuing bonds and running budgetary deficit. However, they may apply for 
central budgetary resources; acquire centrally delegated bonds; nationalize collective land and sell 
land use rights; create local financial vehicles for infrastructure development who can file for loans; 
use locally extracted revenues from SOEs, non-state ventures, and land; use political influence 
through local party organs on local level branches of central banks for the development government 
projects. 
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bureaucracy despite the fact that the state monopolized the state-owned economy and 
thereby the extraction and distribution of resources. The state should be interpreted in the 
context of the party-state network in general and in its Chinese pattern specifics in particular. 
Owing to elements, principles of connection and operation, instruments of power of the party 
reach out to the positional, organizational, activity structure and individual party members in 
the non-party hierarchy. This refers to state-owned or state controlled enterprises, schools, 
cultural or health-care units, the army, the police, the trade union, the different level 
authorities and their organizations, including central government and government hights, 
the parliament, the state coucil etc. Varieties are found depending on which level of the party 
hierarchy these instuments of power origin from and are handeled, how dense these 
instruments are, whom do they reach, how short is the distance between actors holding party 
and non-party positions (there are cases when party and non-party positions overlap in one 
person), to which level of the party hierarchy the interlinking lines of those defined as 
strategic actors are linked, how dense their feed-backs are and which levels they reach. Thus, 
the Party, through its instruments of power politically monopolizes the state and state-
functions, while the state monopolizes the state owned economy and resource distribution. 
Consequently, both indirectly through the state and by directly reaching out to SOEs, the 
Party politically monopolizes the state-owned economy and thereby resource extraction and 
distribution.9  
From 2003 onwards, state ownership functions were delegated to the SASAC – State 
owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission -- located at different levels of the 
state administration (until county level). This move did not change ownership structure, just 
the power distribution among organizations through modified subordination. All together in 
2011 there were 25 000 centrally and regionally subordinated state owned and state 
controlled companies in the industry and construction sector, a small portion of all 325,609 
enterprises (NBS, 2013). If subsidiaries are included, their number increases to 100,000. 
From the 25,000, the number of centrally controlled enterprises is 120 that increases to 
10,000 with subsidiaries included (Szamosszegi and Kyle, 2011). The three top positions 
(party secretary, chairman of the board and CEO) of the top 50 SOEs from the 120 centrally 
managed state owned enterprises are appointed directly by the central cadre department 
called CPC Organization Department (COD) and the selected executives are reviewed and 
approved by the Standing Committee of the Politburo.  Different levels of subordination 
                                                        
9 The central nomenklatura list comprises the top 5,000 positions in the Party‐state, all of which are 
controlled by the COD (M.Cs. Central organization Department). The list includes all ministerial 
and vice‐ministerial positions, provincial governorships and first Party secretary appointments, as 
well as appointments of university chancellors, presidents of the Academy of Science and Academy 
of Social Sciences, etc. 
http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/10_26_11_CapitalTradeSOEStudy.pdf p. 76. 
Similar nomenklatura lists composed of lower positions level are handled by lower level CODs.  
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means one level up control by the party hierarchy of local government organizations and 
direct control by the party organization of the management of the same level. This concerns 
the enteprise manager, division heads and party secretary within the enterprise. According to 
Pei, half of the senior executives are appointed by the CCP (Pei Mingxing referred by 
Szamosszegi and Kyle, 2011). State owned or state dominated enterprises’ share in sales 
revenues are way much concentrated than their number, though unevenly distributed at 
provincial level: for example, in 2010, their share in VAT taxes ranged from 16 to 91 percent, 
and from 16 to 71 percent of all urban fixed investments in the provinces and were employing 
14-53 percent of the workers. Sales revenues shares in strategic industries are concentrated to 
some few large state-owned enterprises subordinated to the central SASAC (Table 1).  
Not only state-owned and state controlled enterprises are embedded in the network, but 
so are state-onwned banks. In 2009, nearly three‐quarters of China’s bank assets were 
controlled by banks in which the state, at a minimum, was the largest shareholder 
(Szamosszegi and Kyle, 2011, p. 43). Interlinking dependency lines embrace state-owned and 
state-controlled banks, be they centers or affiliates, the same way as other non-party 
organizations at different levels and influence the political rationality of their resource 
distribution behavior. 
Table 1.   
Number of SOEs in strategic sectors and their share of sales-revenue in 
Industry Number of 
large SOEs 
Share of 
sales 
revenue % 
Coal 3 13.0 
Shipping 3 60.7 
Power  8 70.0 
Automobile 6 74.0 
Air transport 5 76.0 
Petroleum 4 76.6 
Telecom 3  95.0 
Source: compiled by the author from 
http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/10_26_11_CapitalTradeSOEStudy.pdf 
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Unfortunately NBS does not provide national or provincial level investment data by 
enterprise size, neither scale in itself is distinguished. Only their number, gross industrial 
output value and assets are published according to large-and-medium sized enterprises and 
according to national and provincial level. Still, we can confirm that in 2013 the average share 
in the numbers of large and middle size enterprises from all enterprises on national level was 
17.9 that varied from 11.0 to 30.9%. This share is a small portion of the average in gross 
industrial output value 65.2 (provincially between 50.2 and 80.0 % in 2011) and that of fixed 
assets 71.6 (57.1-85.7%) (China Statistical Yearbook 2014). Thus, the importance of large and 
medium sized enterprises is way much larger than their number would suggest. Moreover, 
judgeing from the different regional dispersion of the share in the number, gross industrial 
output value and assets of large and medium sized enterprises by province, the extent of 
attracting, extracting, allocating and resisting capacity within the network at the given level 
and thereby its capacity for self-reproduction will differ substantially, and so will the capacity 
for cummulated integration of enterprises into the network. This inequality may result in 
different structural patterns of power distribution that in other words, implies the different 
ways and extent of transformation of the economic system at local levels. However, no matter 
the shares, the strength, the extracting and distributing capacity and the level of aggregation 
in the distribution of power, self-similar distributional characteristics according to the 
model’s predictions should prevail within the network.  
Empirical data of a city level survey and our concept of self-similarity of selective 
distribution at different aggregation levels and at different units on each aggregation however 
allows us to expand the scope of our findings that support our concept to the Chinese system. 
During three years of observation when crisis hit the most, resource distribution criteria did 
not differ from those characteristic in party states. Large, state owned and strongly integrated 
enterprises into the decision-making system were in the focus of distributing authorities 
according to politically rational selection criteria (Csanadi, 2006).
10
  
 
                                                        
10 Chances to get privileged are above the average for enterprises which are large, state-owned or 
state-controlled, centrally subordinated, with strong connections to banks and government 
departments and who have combined personal positions in party and state forums, with 
government as collateral, exporting and strongly hit by the crisis reacting to zero or negative profit 
with fund raising and R and D rather than rationalization. On the other hand, chances are below 
average for those non-state medium and small enterprises subordinated to lower levels of the 
administration who were not as strongly hit by the crisis but are profit sensitive reacting to zero 
profit or loss with rationalizations of production and producing factors, have no strong connections 
to banks and government departments and have no collaterals. Despite substantial economic 
transformation allocation preferences of state intervention during crisis motivate drive for growth 
and integration into the decision-making network rather than adaptation to market circumstances 
(Csanádi and Liu, 2012). 
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DYNAMICS OF STATE FUNCTIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE NETWORK AND 
ITS PATTERN SPECIFICS 
Owing to strong resisting capacity to interventions, China’s party-state pattern is highly 
sensitive to hardening external and internal constraints both in case of their alternative or 
simultaneous occurrence and length of prevalence. Pressures during operation and during 
transformation will influence the advancement or retreat of state functions and the 
implementation of monetary or fiscal means. However, shock induced by the crisis activates 
state interventions, interventions activate the decision-making network, the network in turn, 
activates the system characteristics of resource distribution and spur the structural 
motivation of economic units for growth and thereby for repetitive investment overheating. 
Owing to self-similar characteristics of the network, overheating is present in time, space and 
different aggregation levels, during the self-reproduction and the transformation of the 
network.
11
  
Transformation is generally simplified to the decentralization and withdrawal of 
monopolized state functions and privatization of state-owned economy and their transfer to 
an indirectly regulated expanding market. However, in reality regarding the economy they 
should be interpreted as a multidimensional process. The systemic transformation process 
evolves as the party-state network is retreating as a social system from monopolized sub-
spheres, and the sub-spheres of a new social system are emerging outside of the network. 
Transformation may be absolute, when physical changes in the network occur: bargaining 
through the channels declines (the network is emptied), weakened, constrained, or cut off. 
Transformation may be also relative, when either the network does not retreat but emergence 
and expansion of the new subfiled (political or economic) is in process, or the speed of retreat 
is faster than the speed of emergence, or both are expanding but the speed of emerging 
subfild is higher. The dynamics of relative or absolute retreat and emergence develop in 
strong interaction. Variations in the absolute and relative dynamics of transformation and 
their combinations will present different types of transformation dynamics that may show 
different spatial configurations at different levels of aggregation (Csanádi, Gyuris, Lai, 2009).  
                                                        
11 Heep (2014) compares Chinese state functions to those of the non-traditional developmental states 
in general and concludes that there are major similarities since reforms begun in in late 1970, 
strengthened in early 1990s after Deng’s southern tour. Factors are: the rationalized functions of 
planning considering reforms, the reliance on marketization, long-term macro-economic policy and 
selective development, comprehensive industrial strategies. At the same time, Heep refers to 
factors that show inconsistency with the criteria of developmental states: the expanded state 
ownership of institutions of resource distribution, detailed state intervention, monopoly over 
resource distribution, large influence of state owned enterprises, high degree of control over the 
financial system, political purpose of development to keep the Party’s grip on power and the faint 
influence of private entrepreneurs. Factors mentioned by Heep are characteristic phenomena of 
party-state systems described by the IPS model that Heep does not consider. 
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Different tranformation dynamics are influenced by multiple individual historical, 
cultural, economic geopolitical reasons but have also multidimensional system-conforming 
factors that interplay with those. Such are: differences among patterns, differences within 
patters, differences due to the density and strictness of intertwine between aggregation levels 
and the different dynamics of the external enviornment. All these individual, structural 
characteristics and timing will influence the differences in the sequence (first economic or 
political, or simultaneous), speed (gradual or abrupt) and conditions of transformation 
(economic transformation under authoritarian or democratic rule, accompanied by 
macroeconomic growth or decline). Sequence, speed and conditions however are not issues 
of strategic choice but instead are defined by structural constraints. However, no matter the 
pattern, the process of transformation is not a continuum in direction or speed: it may speed 
up, slow down and even temporary reverse under alternative or simultaneous external and 
internal pressures of adaptation. Dynamics of transformation may change temporary in 
space, in time and among different aggregation levels, and may influence the interrelated 
dynamics of absolute and relative transformation (Csanádi, 2006, 2009, 2011a, 2011b; 
Csanádi and Liu, 2012). The higher the resisting capacity of actors, the more frequent the 
occasions of hardening constraints of self-reproduction of the system and the stronger is the 
escalation of pattern-conforming instruments during adaptation that contribute to the 
evolution of system transformation.  The higher the frequency of meeting hardening 
constraints the more gradual the transformation process through adaptation will be. 
Oppositely, the lower the resisting capacity, the less frequently the system meets hard 
constraints of self-reproduction inciting adaptation, the more abrupt the initials of 
transformation will be since adaptation was not necessary. The same structural reasons will 
contribute to different systemic outcomes (Bunce, 1999; Csanádi, 2006; Bohle & Greskovits, 
2012). Uncertainties during transformation in all patterns are cumulated (Bunce, Csanádi, 
1993). What differs is the level, intensity and persistence of cumulated uncertainty and the 
predictability of outcome. In countries located in the Self-exploiting pattern cumulated 
uncertainties are higher, last longer and outcome will less predictable and in a longer 
spectrum (see from Romania to Kirgiztan) than at countries in the context of the other two 
patterns. 
During the process of transformation as the network retreats lines overlapping the 
economic and political and administrative sub-spheres are cut, emptied, weakened or 
withdrawn. This may occur gradually or abruptly, sequentially or parallel in different sub-
fields, and different levels of aggregation, and at different units at one aggregation level, 
according to the given pattern influenced by the expansion of the field outside the retreating 
network. 
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CHINA, A PATTERN VARIETY OF TRANSFORMING PARTY-STATES 
Not only delegation of decision-making power to sub-national levels and state-owned 
enterprises occurred from the mid 1980s but also the start of the absolute retreat of the 
network: as cooperatives in agriculture were dissolved, and household responsibility system 
introduced, interlinking lines formerly attached to cooperatives remained in limbo. Also the 
scope and quantity of compulsory production for state procurement was narrowed, higher 
prices in state procurement were applied, the dual track system was introduced, thereby 
allowing peasants to sell their over-the-plan products on market prices, Retreat of the 
network in agriculture was followed by the the escalation of decentralized decisions (resource 
revealing reforms) through the network in industry from early-mid 1980s. This process went 
parallel to the introduction of dual-track pricing in the industry, and the attraction of FDI 
with the opening-up. Both processes further strengthened the decentralized character of the 
Chinese power network, the resisting capacity of local actors that lead to frequently 
hardening reproduction constraints of the whole network (Csanádi, 2005). Reactions to 
tensions provoqued economic restrictions and political centralization efforts and thereby the 
temporary expansion of the network from the late 1980s that culminated in the Tiannanmen 
Square protests and its bloody clamp down. But centralizing efforts soon failed, the economy 
slowed down drasticly provoquing hardening reproduction constraints of the network in the 
self-withdrawing pattern. From early 1990s on, parallel to rebooted decentralizig reforms 
within the network, the implementation of pattern-conforming measures accelerated, 
gradually increasing the field outside the network.  
The Chinese pattern of power distribution and dynamics provides the „Chinese style”of 
transformation: the gradual, decentralizing reforms within the decentralized network and the 
gradual reforms outside the network expanding the market sphere, reflect a process of 
economic transformation first (Figure 2), under authoritarian rule accompanied by macro-
economic growth. During this process, party legitimacy prevailed as resources extracted form 
the expanding private sphere could be redistributed within the network allowing its 
reproduction along the self-similar distributional priorities. 
 
 
21 
 
Figure 2  
Transformation „Chinese style” 
 
Note: The basic network is represented by the party and state hierarchy with vertical and interlinking 
lines to state property. The above structure was traced down empirically in the Hungarian case 
therefore, names of ministries, highest organizations, or party departments and parliament as well as 
name and density of interlinking depedency lines vary but elements, connecting principles and 
operating principles are self-similar.12 This figure serves as illustration of the basis of the network. 
 
The process of retreat (Figure 3) begun with the decentralization of decisions within the 
network for bringing decisions to the level of real economy labelled enterprise and manager 
responsibility system regarding production, marketing, investment decisions, expansion 
plans, and staff, that also provided profit retention opportunities. Later competitive capital, 
manpower and organizations empty the network (strip off) to join the expanding market 
sphere. At the same time alternative capital, actors and interests enter the network as owners 
                                                        
12 Hierarchical (D1) lines within party and state hierarchy; interlinking (D2) lines as instruments of 
Party power: No nomenklatura responsibility; Ins instructor system To subject-matter (topic) 
responsibility system; Pl party lieson system: coordination and consultation between branch 
ministries and local party organizations; Pe connections of party organizations in enterprises with 
the Personnel Department of the branch ministries concerning cadre issues Co regular consultation 
between enterprise pc and ministry pc; G interventions in the name of general economic policy 
responsibilities of the party; DP deputies in the Parliament with party membership; PC local party 
committees; pc party committees within organizations; CCC central controling committee; EPC 
Economic Policy Committee; DPMO Department of Party Mass Organizations; DIAT Department 
of Industry, Agricultureasn transportation; DEP Department of Economic Policy; MCCO 
Ministerial Councils’ Council Office; SPC State Planning Office; EC(S) Economic Committee of the 
State 
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in joint ventures, shareholders, members in Peoples’ Parliament or in inter-ministerial 
committees etc.. 
Figure 3  
Retreating network from the economic sub-field in China 
 
This process, owing to the infiltration of alternative decisions, interests, organizations, 
formally and informally weakens the influence of the party on the economy through the 
network. Former distributive functions were withdrawn from lower levels allowing 
enterprises greater freedom in deciding about investments up to a certain volume. The 
network has been increasingly cut through privatization, close-downs and bankruptcy of 
state-owned enterprises, leaving the direct interlinking and hierarchical lines in limbo. 
Simultaneously the party also makes efforts to expand its formal and informal influence on 
the private sphere through private or collective neterprises founded by local party executives, 
or by succeeding to form party cells in private enterprises. 
The market field began to expand when (Figure 4) the dual-track pricing regulations were 
introduced both in agriculture and industry that allowed producers to sell their over-the plan 
agricultural and industrial products on market prices. Besides dual track system, further 
expansion of the market was allowed by „opening up”. This move attracted resources from 
the global economy in the form of FDI in the form of green field investments outsied the 
network or in economic units embraced by the network. 
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Figure 4  
Expansion of the economic sub-sphere outside the network in China 
 
 
 
New private enterprises (both domestic and foreign) were allowed to be set up, the 
number of special economic zones were increased and investment-friendly laws were 
implemented that attracted foreign capital. Further expansion was boosted by those who 
transferred capital, organization and skills and manpower from the network to the private 
sphere and by those SOEs and collective units who were privatized. All of these activities 
stimulated the fast growth of rural to urban migration absorbed by the expanding 
competitive sphere.  
 
ADAPTATION TO EXTERNAL SHOCKS IN THE TRANSFORMING SYSTEM 
PATTERN IN CHINA 
Empirical reseach results reveal that despite China’s substantial transformation towards a 
market economy, the occasional need for increased state intervention has mobilized the 
characteristics of the party-state system at all aggregation levels temporary increasing the 
expansion of the network. Pattern characteristics determine the extent of state intervention 
and its pattern-conforming instruments of resource extraction and distribution. Disparities 
in the dynamics of transformation may be detected also at subnational levels of the network, 
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suposedly depending on the number of large enterprises, the power distribution at local level, 
capacity to attract, extract and distribute resources. Thus, the different sensitivity and 
adaptation of lower level units may change the spatial configuration of the dynamics of 
transformation at different periods on the given level. Such characteristics were 
demonstrated in the early and mid 2000 in the transforming Chinese self-withdrawing 
pattern (Csanádi, Lai & Gyuris, 2009). „Local level” and embeddedness variegation will differ 
in different historical periods of development level of centralization (nationally and locally) 
extention, depth and density of the network, in different stages of operation and of 
transformation and in its different dynamics and degree of openness.  
The stimulus package introduced in 2008 was the direct adaptive consequence of an 
external shock caused by the global crisis and the subsequent government reaction in the 
form of intensified state intervention that mobilized economic actors. In fact, state 
intervention opened up new chances for selective resource distribution in the form of central, 
local budgetary and bank resources in the construction sector, with preference given to large-
size and state-owned enterprises cumulatively integrated enterprises in the decision-making 
processes through the network. Newly opening chances similarly mobilized the politically 
rational economic behavior of actors to hoard resources and invest. Owing to the political 
rationality of economic behavior in the system, market-conforming “personnel policy” 
incentives and decentralization of fiscal decisions within the network will be translated to 
politically rational rather than efficiency oriented behavior while promoting economic growth 
as expected by Knight (2012) based on the concept of developmental state. 
This phenomenon took shape during the implementation of a stimulus package after 
2008 in the selective allocation of central and local budgetary and bank resources to 
enterprises The locus of increasing activity in both the geographical space and the hierarchy 
of aggregation levels was determined by the specifics of decentralized Chinese party-state 
system and the decentralized distribution of responsibilities and chances to extract and 
allocate resources. Systemic characteristics of the party-state together with their Chinese 
specifics resulted in investment overheating and steadily growing local indebtedness through 
large and state-owned enterprises and local governments. The features of China’s 
transforming economy further amplified this process, since the increased demand for inputs 
on the side of enterprises, which state intervention privileged due to its systemic priorities, 
also mobilized actors in the private sphere (Csanádi, 2013b, Yu, 2011). Consequences were: 
overheating, excess capacity, non performing loans, local indebtedness and slower GDP 
growth.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
The aim of the study was to define the main system characteristics of the emerging Chinese 
market, the structural characteristics of the „Chinese style” as well as the state’s behavior in 
the context of those characteristics. Based on the implemented comparative analytical model 
supported by empirical research we argue that the Chinese system and its specifics should 
not be pressed into the present standards of varieties of capitalism. China is a communist 
system described with a politically monopolized power network among actors in the party, 
the state and the economy, with its self-similar elements, principles of connection and 
operation in time, space and levels of aggregation. At the same time Chinese party-state is a 
structural variety of the patterns of power distribution caracterized by a pattern of 
decentralized power network with pattern-conforming instruments of resource extraction 
and distribution: resource creating reforms outside the network and decentralizing reforms 
within the network. Chinese system’s pattern-conforming operation simultaneously incites 
pattern-conforming system transformation. Specifics of the Chinese pattern of power 
distribution and instruments of self-reproduction lead to specific sequence, speed and 
conditions of system transformation. The sequence is: economic transformation first, as the 
network is retreating from the economic subfield while the market field outside the network 
is expanding. The speed of the transformation process is gradual, while conditions of 
economic transformation and thereby the emerging market are defined by an authoritarian 
regime and accompanied by macroeconomic growth that preserves party legitimacy.  
Chinese self-withdrawing pattern and transformation specifics differ from that of its 
former European counterparts with self-exploiting and self-disintegrating patterns of power 
distribution. These patterns transform either first politically rather than economically or 
through abrupt collapse of the network and parallel transformation of all subfields. Thus, the 
Chinese communist system should be compared to – but not identified with -- other present 
or former transforming party-state systems with similar or different patterns of power 
distribution. At the same time, the transforming Chinese communist system and the 
transformed post- socialist systems are not comparable on common systemic grounds.  
In the Chinese transformation process the role and actions of the likely “fragmented” 
polymorphous state (Howell, 2006) embedded in the power network both on national and 
local levels and the consequence of its actions in the transforming systemic context is 
similarly complex. This complexity is reflected in the state intervention during global crisis: 
intervention provided new chances for resource distribution that mobilized distribution 
priorities and politically rational economic behavior of actors, characteristic to party-state 
systems. Consequently, no wander that the Chinese development cannot smoothly fit in the 
strict criteria of the varieties of capitalism. In fact, in case we were looking for an 
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institutionalized model – be it communist or capitalist – it will show incoherence in all 
dimensions (Peck and Zhang, 2013; Zhang and Peck, 2014, Howell, 2006, Rutley, 2012).
13
  
What we find behind the incoherence is a dynamic process that presents simultaneously 
(1) The structural and dynamic self-similar characteristics of party-state systems in general: 
in time, in space and at different levels of aggregation. (2) The structural and dynamic 
specifics of the Chinese party-state system in particular: decentralized power network on 
national level and different varieties of party-state power structures on local levels;  (3) The 
impact of the specific pattern characteristics of the Chinese system on the transformation 
regarding the sequence, speed and political and economic conditions of transformation on 
national and different sub-national levels of aggregation; (4) The characteristics of the 
emerging and expanding path-dependent and geopolitically influenced capitalist economy 
strongly tied to the politically monopolized network (on national and local levels) that is 
gradually, and spatially differently, retreating from the economic sub-sphere; (5) The strong 
interaction between the retreating network and emerging market sphere at national and sub-
national levels while adapting to external pressures, that provide their changing dynamics 
during different periods of transformation. Consequently, transformation dynamics is not a 
linear process on national or local levels: speed and conditions of transformation are 
constantly in move due to the changing dynamics of the retreating network and emerging 
market sphere, and their interaction and external dynamics.  
Concluding the above, China is a transforming party-state system with characteristics of 
decentralized pattern of power distribution and respective sequence, speed and conditions of 
transformation that may differ in time, in space and at different levels of its aggregation. 
The transforming Chinese party-state system should not be identified with any variety of 
capitalist systems, or with a centralized pattern of communist systems, neither with 
concluded system transformations of post-socialist countries. Varieties of capialism and 
socialism attributed to the Chinese pattern of power – be they approached from political, 
economic, central or local dimensions -- should be interpreted in the context of China’s 
transforming structural and dynamic party-state specifics at all aggregation levels. Based on 
the above, phenomena of hybrid capitalism, developmental state, variegated capitalism, 
polymorphous, predatory, entrepreneur state, state socialism, state socialism etc. may all be 
simultaneously untangled approaching from different angles of the complex structure. 
However, they are all deeply embedded in the self-similar and specific structural and 
dynamic features of the transforming Chinese party-state system. For example, hybrid 
                                                        
13 Peck and Zhang describing variegated capitalism at local levels and Howell when criticizing the 
efforts of presenting China as a developmental state concluding on polymophous state both arguing 
about the decentralized state functions, administration and variety of goals and behavior of local 
governments find the phenomena behind which the general and specific structural characteristics 
lay (Csanádi, 1997, 2006); 
 
 
27 
 
capitalism is revealed from the angle of the economy, developmental state from the angle of 
the central administrative structure, polymorphous state and varigated capitalism from the 
angle of different levels of aggregation of the power network, and state-socialism from the 
angle of the political subfield. However, in themselves, neither of these approaches consider 
the the context they are embedded: the complex network of dependency and interest 
promotion among party- state- and economic decision-makers, and its different levels of 
aggregation, the different structures in space on one aggregation level and its consequences 
that amalgamate all these different angles in one complex transforming system and its 
pattern- and country-specific characteristics.
14
 By neglecting the network these approaches 
can not consider the complexity  the dynamics of this network either: the mutual impact of 
different operations emerging from different distributions of power both at different 
aggregation levels and in space at each aggregation level.  
Thus, China is not an outlier capitalist system, neither is a socialist market economy or in 
itself, a developmental state without communist system characteristics but one of the well 
embedded patterns of the communist power network in a period of system transformation 
described by the Interactive Party-State model. Therefore, the role and behavior of the state 
at central and local levels in China should also be interpreted in the context of the 
transforming politically monopolized decentralized power network, and its dynamics -- both 
at „normal” times and at crisis situations. Economic functions, actions, organizations and 
behavior of the central and local governments should be analyzed embedded in the power 
network (be those taxation, reforms, centralization, decentralization, fiscal, monetary 
restrictions or stimulus packages, privatization, close-down, restructuring of SOEs, selective 
distribution of resources, lending, clamp down on corruption etc). Similarly, behavior of 
groups, organizations, or individual actors should not be analyzed without their systemic and 
dynamic context. State’s role and expanding or shrinking market at any level and time should 
be interpreted in strong interaction with the dynamics of the retreating or expanding network 
and domestic and external pressures. 
 Owing to the simultaneous presence of different systems in the transforming Chinese 
party-state, each „snapshot” on the complex system will differ in different historical periods 
of development in different stages of its transformation and with its actual interaction with 
actual international context.  
 
                                                        
14 The finest distinction and simultaneous interdependency between the state, state ownership and 
emerging capitalism, where resources for reproducing political legitimacy is served by the 
expanding private field is presented by McNally (2014, p. 122), without however relying on the 
power network. 
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